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I. Introduction
Offshore tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions worldwide hold
over $11 trillion of high net-worth individuals' assets.' Of that
figure, $1 trillion offshore are held by United States citizens.2 As a
result of offshore accounts, the U.S. government estimates it loses
$100 billion a year in tax revenue stashed in offshore accounts.3
Offshore tax evasion is an increasing problem in the
enforcement of U.S. tax laws.4 The majority of these offshore
accounts are located in the financial institutions of tax haven
countries.5 A "tax haven" country is defined as a country having
low tax rates compared to the United States and a high level of bank
or commercial secrecy that the country refuses to breach, even
under an international agreement.6
A significant portion of these accounts are located in the
* J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Hastings College of the Law; B.B.A., B.A., The
University of Texas at Austin, 2007. I dedicate this Note to my mother, Haixia
Zhang, my fianc6 Jeffery Lee, and the rest of my family for unlimited love and
support. I would especially like to thank Professor Susan C. Morse for her
generous guidance and encouragement with this Note. Lastly, I would like to
thank the entire team of devoted editors and staff of HICLR for making the
publication of this Note possible.
1. See, e.g., Briefing Paper The Price of Offshore, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK (Mar.
2005), available at http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price of
Offshore.pdf (estimating that offshore assets of high net worth individuals now
total $11.5 trillion).
2. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND
SECRECY: MINORITY & MAJORITY STAFF REPORT 1 (2006), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/ public/_files/TAXHAVENABUSESREPORT107.pdf.
3. Trevor Cole, How I Learned to Hide Money from the Taxman in the Shell-
Company Capital of the World, With Help from A Cabbie Named Shorty, A Jet-Setting
Fraud Investigator and A Curious Cast Of Caribbean Bankers, GLOBEADVISOR.COM (Jan.
28, 2011), https:/ /secure.globeadvisor.com/ servlet/ ArticleNews/ story/ gam/
20110128/ROBMAG-FEB11-P44-50 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
4. Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit Information With Other Countries: Should
Tax Compliance Or Privacy Claims Prevail?, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 579, 590 (2004) (quoting
Treasury Thanks Lawmakers for Letter on NRA Interest-Reporting Rules, 2003 TNT
124-61 (letter sent by Pamela F. Olson, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy, to twenty-four members of the House of Representatives)).
5. William M. Sharp, Sr. et al., U.S. Tax Information Exchange Agreements: A
Comparative Analysis, 97 TAX NOTES 827, 827 (2002).
6. Blum, supra note 4, at 591.
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financial institutions of the People's Republic of China and in the
special jurisdiction of Hong Kong. 7 Although China is no longer
recognized as an official tax haven country by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)8, its secrecy
jurisdiction, Hong Kong, has become a serious player in offering
attractive offshore banking to the world's wealthy.9 To this day,
Hong Kong still offers some of the world's most secret accounts, and
U.S. tax authorities are increasingly wary of Hong Kong as an
attractive offshore banking center. 10
A daunting task for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is
obtaining the necessary information to enforce tax laws where
international transactions are involved when the taxpayer does not
cooperate." When information is located in a foreign jurisdiction
such as China, it is often beyond the reach of the IRS.12 Addressing
the potential for tax evasion through use of offshore accounts is
critical to maintaining the fairness of the U.S. tax system.13
Similarly, it has been estimated that households in China hide
as much a 9.3 trillion yuan ($1.5 trillion) of income that is
unreported to the Chinese tax administration. 14 A large amount of
this unreported income is deposited in bank accounts in the United
States.15 Financial institutions in the United States are widely
7. See Justin Dabner, How should Asia respond to the OECD's harmful tax regimes
project?, 18 J. INT'L TAX'N 42, 49 (2007) (discussing the harmful tax practices of Hong
Kong and mainland China).
8. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is
an international economic organization of thirty-four countries founded in 1961 to
stimulate economic progress and world trade. One of its objectives is to promote
global tax transparency by launching initiatives to combat against international tax
evasion.
9. Lynnley Browning, Seeking Bank Secrecy in Asia, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23swiss.html.
10. Id.
11. Richard A. Gordon et al., An Analysis of Tax Information Exchange Agreements
Concluded by the U.S., 22 TAX MGM'T INT'L J. (1991).
12. Id.; see also Blum, supra note 4, at 592.
13. Blum, supra note 4, at 590 (quoting Treasury Thanks Lawmakers for Letter on
NRA Interest-Reporting Rules, 2003 TNT 124-61 (letter sent by Pamela F. Olson,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, to twenty-four members of the
House of Representatives)).
14. China's Rich Have $1.5 Trillion In Hidden Income, THE STRAITS TIMES (Aug. 12,
2010), http://www.straitstimes.com/SME+Spotlight/Lifestyle/Story/STIStory
565373.html
15. Derek Scissors, Chinese investment in US: $2 trln and counting, REUTERS (Mar.
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regarded as more secure, better regulated, and better managed
compared to the rest of the world.16 As a result, investments held by
Chinese residents in the United States have amounted to over $1.6
trillion since June 2010.17
This Note will first explain how offshore accounts make tax
evasion possible and the significant role of domestic bank secrecy
laws in facilitating tax evasion in the United States and China. Next,
it will introduce the Tax Information Exchange Agreement
proposed by the OECD and its past and current efforts to increase
global tax information sharing.
Lastly, it will conclude by exploring how despite the current
offshore tax evasion crisis occurring between these two countries,
the Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) is an ineffective
mechanism and will neither truly eliminate tax evasion.
II. How Offshore Accounts Facilitate Tax Evasion
Under U.S. tax law, every taxpayer must report his or her
domestic source of income to the IRS, including all bank account
interest or other income.18 Consequently, deposits made by U.S.
residents in foreign bank accounts are also subject to taxation. 19 The
Bank Secrecy Act requires that U.S. residents with an offshore
account exceeding $10,000 to report to the IRS through the Foreign
Bank and Financial Account Report. 20 They must also report this
income on Schedule B of Form 1040.21
Bank accounts in bank secrecy jurisdictions, such as Hong
Kong, are ideal for concealment of illegally earned funds.22 Future
earnings can be concealed from the home country's taxes. 23 It may
be impossible for the IRS or other creditors to collect debts against
2, 2011), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/india-expertzone/2011/03/02/
chinese-investment-in-us-2-trln-and-counting/
16. Robert Goulder, News Analysis: How the U.S. is a Tax Haven for Mexico's
Wealthy, 124 TAx NOTEs 739, 740 (2009).
17. Scissors, supra note 15.
18. See Goulder, supra note 16, at 741.
19. Id.
20. The report is on Form TD F 90-22.1, entitled "Report of Foreign Bank and
Financial Accounts." Section 5314 of the Bank Secrecy Act authorizes the Treasury
to issue regulations requiring these reports. 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2010).
21. Blum, supra note 4, at 596 n.54.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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these assets.24 The role of bank secrecy will be further explored in
the following section.
Also, U.S. banks facilitate foreign account tax evasions. An
individual's interest income earned from U.S. bank deposits is not
subject to tax in the United States, although it generally will be
subject to tax in the nonresident's country of residence. 25 Therefore,
a Chinese resident who holds a bank account in the United States is
not subject to taxation in the United States. However, she must
report her income to the Chinese government and would likely be
taxed in China, the country of her residence. 26
III. Bank Secrecy Overview
"Bank secrecy is an area of dispute between two groups of
countries: one group that permits its banks to keep depositors'
identities secret, and the rest of the world that wants to enforce
taxation of the income earned by those accounts." 27 Bank secrecy is
a professional obligation that financial institutions assume and
provide confidentiality to a customer's financial information
acquired in the course of business.28  Bank secrecy laws give
financial institutions the right to resist a third party's inquiries in
order to protect the customer's interests, the most prominent third
party being the government. 29
Tax evasion is often achieved through hiding assets in
jurisdictions that have strict bank secrecy laws.30 Americans who
desire to evade taxes generally seek offshore jurisdictions with a
high level of bank secrecy laws to keep their bank deposits
concealed. Offshore jurisdictions with stringent bank secrecy
regimes such as Hong Kong will keep the IRS from inquiring into
their American bank customers' information and consequently
24. Id.
25. Goulder, supra note 16, at 741; 26 U.S.C. § 881(d) (2010).
26. See Paul DiSangro & Wendy Liu, India, like China, is taxing offshore
acquisitions, NIXON PEABODY (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/
publications-detail3.asp?ID=3482.
27. Robert Carroll, Bank Secrecy, Tax Havens and International Tax Competition,
167 TAx FOUND. 2 (2009).
28. He Ping, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering, 7 J. MONEY LAUNDERING
CONTROL 376, 376 (2004).
29. Id.
30. Lee A. Sheppard, Getting Serious About Offshore Evasion?, 125 TAX NOTEs 493,
495 (2009).
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protect their American customers from the possibility of being taxed
by the U.S. tax authorities. As a result, bank accounts in bank
secrecy jurisdictions are ideal for the concealment of funds that
represent unreported income in the residence country.31
The reason that bank secrecy laws are enacted is because these
countries benefit from them. By enacting stringent bank secrecy
laws that help foreign wealthy individuals transfer their assets to
their country, banks attract capital to promote growth in the
country's financial industry. Countries that receive extensive
foreign investment have enjoyed very rapid economic growth due
to the development of their financial sector. 32
A. Bank Secrecy Laws in Mainland China and Hong Kong
In China, banking secrecy laws exist and are provided for
under the Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial
Banks.33 Although there seem to have been numerous effortS34 by
the Chinese government to relax bank secrecy laws to promote
transparency in the past, to this date bank secrecy laws are still
reinforced by the Chinese statutes.35 There may be exceptions in
which tax authorities have access to bank information to response to
a request for exchange of information based on the China-U.S.
Income Tax Treaty, 36 but the treaty does not require the requested
state to "carry out administrative measures at variance with the
laws" of the requested party.37
31. Blum, supra note 4, at 596.
32. Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Which Countries Become Tax Havens?
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 12802, 2006), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2802.
33. Ping, supra note 28, at 379.
34. Erik Eckholm, China to End Bank Secrecy In Effort Against Corruption, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/21/world/china-to-end-
bank-secrecy-in-effort-against-corruption.html; OECD, OECD Assessment Shows
Bank Secrecy As A Shield For Tax Evaders Coming to An End, http://www.oecd.org/
document/40/0,3746,en_2649_33767_43582376 1_111,00.html (last visited Apr. 4,
2012) (Macao and China have passed legislation intended to enable them to
implement the internationally agreed-upon tax standard.)
35. OECD, Tax Co-operation 2010: Towards a Level Playing Field, OECD PUB. 143
(Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/
oecd/ taxation/ tax-co-operation-201 0_taxcoop-2010-en.
36. Id. at 169; Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Tax Evasion on Income, U.S.-China, Apr. 30, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 677
[hereinafter China-U.S. Treaty].
37. China-U.S. Treaty, art. 25.
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However, there are conflicting opinions regarding how bank
secrecy laws are carried out. On one hand, China launched a series
of initiatives in 2003 to lift bank secrecy laws and counter suspicious
foreign transactions and money-laundering.38 China seems to be
implementing the OECD standards.39  However, who makes
decisions and manages China's banking system is unknown.40 The
government and the Communist Party are "intimately entwined
managers of China's financial institutions."41
Nevertheless, Hong Kong is known for its very stringent bank
secrecy laws that promote its growth as an international offshore
bank center. 42 Although Hong Kong has returned to China since
1997, the city's financial activity remains relatively unchanged, a
reflection of Beijing's need for Hong Kong as its financial
powerhouse.43 It does not tax capital gains or deposit interest and
allows the formation of opaque companies that often serve as
conduits for tax evasion.44 Thus, it is simple for the wealthy who
want to save tax dollars to move their bank accounts to Hong Kong.
With recent crackdowns of Swiss offshore banks, many experts
believe that Hong Kong will be the next tax haven destination for
the rich to hide their income. 45
B. Bank Secrecy in the United States
Technically speaking, the United States does not have a formal
bank secrecy regime,46 but the United States provides de facto bank
38. See Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the People's Bank of China, Speech at the
First Meeting of the Ministerial Joint Conference on Anti-money Laundering (Aug.
27, 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r040920a.pdf.
39. See OECD, Fighting Tax Evasion: Questions and Answers, http://www.oecd.
org/document/49/0,3746,en_2649 33745_45599793_1 1_1_1,00.html#qal3 (last
visited Apr. 4, 2012).
40. Vlad Frants, The Competence of the Chinese Taxation System, 18 CURRENTS:
INT'L TRADE L.J. 30, 37 (2010).
41. Id.
42. Laurence E. Lipsher, Asian Tax Review: Hong Kong: Still Clinging to Bank
Secrecy, 55 TAx NOTES INT'L 643, 645 (2009).
43. See Robert E. Bauman, Where Are They Now? The World's Top Asset
Havens.. .Still On Top, ESCAPEARTIST.cOM, http://www.escapeartist.com/efam/
60/BestBanking_ offshore.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
44. Browning, supra note 9.
45. Id.
46. Goulder, supra note 16, at 739.
4172012]
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secrecy to foreign persons holding assets in the U.S.o "De facto bank
secrecy" results when the source-country government, in this case
the United States, does not have the relevant information to
exchange with a tax treaty partner.48 The U.S. de facto bank secrecy
regime therefore allows any foreigner to make deposits in U.S.
banks without disclosing income earned on those deposits to his
home government. 49 All U.S. banks engage in de facto bank secrecy
when they accept deposits from a nonresident alien.50 Therefore,
bank secrecy is evident whenever banking occurs under these
circumstances.5'
IV. OECD's Global Tax Transparency Efforts
Recognizing the demand for global tax transparency, the OECD
intended to provide a framework to combat the current tax evasion
crisis in tax haven countries.52
In 1998, the OECD launched a new initiative campaign
addressing "harmful tax practices" in both member and nonmember
countries.53 The U.S. is a member of the OECD while China has yet
to join.54 More recently, the OECD has been demanding greater tax
information exchange in all aspects from Hong Kong.ss
Initially, the Bush Administration was heavily lobbied to reject
the 1998 initiative.56 On May 10, 2001, the Secretary of the Treasury,
Paul O'Neill, publicly disagreed with the OECD's effort to
harmonize world tax systems due to OECD's overly board
47. David E. Spencer, Fatca and Automatic Exchange of Tax Information, 21 J. INT'L
TAX'N 62, 64 (2010).
48. David E. Spencer, Tax Information Exchange and Bank Secrecy (Part 2) 16 J.
INT'L TAX'N 22, 24 (2005).
49. Id.
50. Goulder, supra note 16, at 740.
51. Id.
52. OECD, Fighting Tax Evasion, http://www.oecd.org/document/21/
0,3746,en_2649_37427_42344853_1_1_137427,00.html.
53. For a thorough discussion of the campaign, see Michael Allen, Tax Evaders
Beware: Rich Countries Prepare for Crackdown on Havens, WALL ST. J. (May 21, 1998), at
A12.
54. See OECD, List of OECD Member countries Ratification of the Convention on
the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1889402
1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
55. Lipsher, supra note 42, at 644-45.
56. Blum, supra note 4, at 597.
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initiatives.57  As a result, the OECD initiative underwent
modifications in June 200158 and only required tax haven countries
to commit to transparency and effective information exchange. 59
In April 2002, the OECD released its Model Tax Information
Exchange Agreements, 60 the "TIEA," to reflect standards of effective
exchange of information, which will be fully discussed in the next
section. As of 2011, thirty-two cooperating countries have agreed to
engage in the exchange of such information with respect to criminal
and civil tax matters, beginning in 2006.61
During 2001 and 2002, the Bush Administration negotiated
exchange of information agreements with tax haven countries, 62
such as the Netherlands, Antilles, the British Virgin Islands,
Bahamas, Antigua and Barbuda, and the Cayman Islands. 63 In 2003,
the U.S. entered into an agreement with Switzerland,64 a notorious
tax haven country that troubles the tax authorities of the rest of the
world.65
V. The Launch of Tax Information Exchange Agreements
The Tax Information Exchange Agreement is a treaty developed
by the OECD Global Forum Working Group to promote
international cooperation for exchange of information. 66 To assist
countries in the negotiation of TIEAs, the OECD published a model
Tax Information Exchange Agreement in April 2002.67
57. Treasury Secretary O'Neill Statement on OECD Tax Havens, Treasury
News, PO-366 (May 10, 2001).
58. See Michael M. Phillips, Accord is Reached by U.S. and Allies on Tax Havens,
WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2001), at A4.
59. Blum, supra note 6, at 598-99 n.62.
60. See OECD, Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
61. See OECD, OECD Report, Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax
Purposes: The 2003 Progress Report (2003), at 18.
62. The OECD has identified those countries as tax haven countries.
63. Blum, supra note 4, at 600.
64. Id. at 600-01.
65. See Michael J. McIntyre, How to End the Charade of Information Exchange, 125
TAX NOTES INT'L 695, 695 (stating that Switzerland's economy has depended heavily
on the revenue derived from the servicing of international tax cheats).
66. See Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), http://www.oecd.org/
document/7/0,3746,en_2649_33767_38312839_1_1_11,00.html (last visited Apr. 4,
2012).
67. Blum, supra note 4, at 599; see also OECD PuB., Agreement on Exchange of
2012] 419
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In essence, the TIEA typically has three specific qualities. First,
it provides for the exchange of information on requests for both
criminal and civil tax matters.68 Second, it provides for the exchange
of information even if such information relates to a person who is
not a resident or national of the United States or a TIEA partner.69
Lastly, it provides for the disclosure of information regardless of
local confidentiality laws that may prohibit such disclosure,
including laws relating to bank secrecy or bearer shares. 70
In the past decade, the United States has entered into TIEAs
with fourteen jurisdictions which were initially labeled by the
OECD as tax haven countries.7 ' China has signed with seven
jurisdictions, including Argentina, Bermuda, and the Bahamas.72
However, these jurisdictions are mostly small tax haven countries
that faced international pressure to comply with the objectives of the
OECD. China and the United States do not have much at stake
when entering TIEAs with these jurisdictions. In contrast, China
and the United States have not yet entered into a TIEA with each
other.73
A. The Scope of Tax Information Exchange Agreements
The intended purpose of the TIEA is to provide tax authorities
with the right to collect tax information that is "foreseeably
relevant" 74 to tax evasion and crimes from the contracted party.
Article 1 of the Model TIEA provides that the "competent
authorities of the Contract Parties shall provide assistance through
exchange of information that is foreseeably relevant to the
administration and enforcement of the domestic laws of the
Information on Tax Matters, art. 1 [hereinafter Model TIEA], http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf.
68. Timothy V. Addison, Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens, 16 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 703, 717 (2009).
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also Chris Horton, The UBS/IRS Settlement Agreement and Cayman
Island Hedge Funds, 41 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 357, 372 (2009).
71. Addison, supra note 68, at 717.
72. See China Signs TIEA with Argentina, CHINA BRIEFING (Dec. 16, 2010), http://
www.china-briefing.com/news/2010/12/16/china-signs-tiea-with-argentina.html
(last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
73. See OECD, Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), http://www.oecd.
org/ document/ 7/ 0,3746,en_2649_33767_383128391 111,00.html (indicating that
the U.S. and China have not signed a TIEA).
74. Model TIEA, supra note 67, art. 1.
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Contract Parties concerning taxes covered by this Agreement." 75
This information includes the determination, assessment and
collection of taxes, the recovery and enforcement of tax claims, or
the investigation or prosecution of tax matters.76
Article 3 further lays out the scope of tax information to be
reported and exchanged according to the agreement.77 The taxes
typically covered are national income taxes of each country. For
example, the TIEA between China and Argentina provides exchange
of individual and enterprise income taxes,7 8 and the TIEA between
the United States and Panama provides the exchange of U.S. federal
income taxes and Panamese national taxes.79
B. TIEA's Exchange of Information on Request
Article 5 is the key and operative provision that enables the
TIEA parties to exchange information.80  It provides that "the
requested"8 party shall provide information for the purposes
referred to in Article 1 upon request. 82 If the requested party does
not receive sufficient information to allow it to comply with the
request, the requested party must notify the applicant83 party and
suggest the additional information needed to fulfill the request.84
The requested party must "take all relevant information gathering
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Agreement Between the Government of the Argentine Republic and the
Government of the People's Republic of China for the Exchange of Information
Relating to Taxes, Arg. - China, art. 3(1)(a)-(b), Dec. 13, 2010, http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/48/33/47115635.pdf (Article 3 states that the agreement applies to
all taxes in Argentina and China except tariff taxes).
79. See Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America
and the Government of the Republic of Panama for Tax Cooperation and the
Exchange Of Information Relating to Taxes, U.S.-Pan., art. 3(1)(a)-(b), Nov. 30, 2010,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/49/46569716.pdf (Article 3 states that the
agreement applies to Panama's national taxes and U.S. federal income taxes).
80. Model TIEA, supra note 67, art. 5.
81. The requested party refers to the corresponding administration of the
country who is asked to provide the taxpayer information by the administration of
the other country.
82. Model TIEA, supra note 67, art. 5.
83. The applicant party refers to the corresponding administration of the
country who requests the taxpayer information from the administration of the other
country.
84. Model TIEA, supra note 67, art. 5(2).
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measures" to provide the requested information, even if the
requested party does not need the information for its own tax
purposes.85 Each party to the TIEA must ensure that its competent
authority has the authority to obtain and provide the requested
information including information held by banks and other financial
institutions.86
However, to obtain such information, the requested party must
provide information to the requested Party to demonstrate the
foreseeable relevance of the information.87 To demonstrate the
requested information's relevance to the request, the applicant party
must provide the identity of the taxpayer under investigation, the
purpose of this information, and the grounds for believing that the
information requested is held in the requested country.88
VI. Tax Information Exchange Agreements Overrides
Bank Secrecy
One key innovative feature of the TIEA is that it overrides a
contracting country's domestic bank secrecy laws. Article 5,
paragraph 4 of the model TIEA makes it clear that a requesting
party cannot avoid disclosure because of domestic bank secrecy
laws or secrecy rules due to fiduciary duties.89 It must provide for
the disclosure of requested information regardless of local bank
secrecy laws that may prohibit such disclosure. 90
If a TIEA is signed by the U.S. and China, the agreement would
provide tax administrations with the capability to overcome each
other's domestic bank secrecy laws.91 If the information is requested
by either U.S. or Chinese tax authorities, neither country can use
domestic bank secrecy laws to refuse to provide the requested
information regarding a taxpayer's account. This would likely open
85. Id.
86. Id. art. 5(4)(a).
87. Id. art. 5.
88. Id. arts. 5(5)(a)-(e) (arts. (f) and (g) omitted).
89. Id. art. 5(4); see also McIntyre, supra note 65, at 706.
90. Testimony of Treasury Acting International Tax Counsel John Harrington
Before the Senate Finance Committee on Offshore Tax Evasion, U.S. Dep't of
Treasury, H.P. 385 (May 3, 2007), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/ Pages/ hp385.aspx.
91. The current U.S.-China treaty does not override local laws such as bank
secrecy laws. See China-U.S. Treaty, supra note 37, art. 25.
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the doors for tax authorities from both countries to track down
concealed offshore accounts in each country and collect taxes on
previously undisclosed income.
VII. Would the United States or China Give Up on Bank
Secrecy and Enter into a TIEA for Greater Information
Exchange?
The answer is very unlikely. Neither the U.S. nor the Chinese
government would likely to give up their bank secrecy and commit
to a TIEA. The reason is that both countries' domestic interests
would be adversely affected by sharing information with each other,
as explained below.
A. The U.S. Perspective
From the U.S. perspective, lifting de facto bank secrecy laws
would put U.S. banks at a competitive disadvantage among global
financial institutions. 92 The likely reason that Congress allowed de
facto bank secrecy exist in the first place was that the U.S. financial
system needs the capital. 93 As explained earlier, bank secrecy laws
attract foreign investments and promote the growth of the financial
industry.
Agreeing to a TIEA would likely hurt the U.S. financial sector,
as foreign tax evaders would inevitably move their funds to other
countries that have tighter bank secrecy laws.94 The U.S. banking
sector would experience an enormous amount of revenue loss as a
result of the withdrawals from nonresident aliens.
It is estimated that Chinese investments in the U.S. amounted to
over $1.6 trillion since June 2010.95 That is a phenomenal figure
compared to the estimated $100 billion loss from offshore accounts
around the world. It would undoubtedly be detrimental to the U.S.
financial institutions if Chinese residents were to start withdrawing
their deposits from U.S. banks.
For example, Florida banks alone fear that they would lose
from $4.4 billion to $8.36 billion each year in operating revenue if
92. See generally Goulder, supra note 16.
93. Id. at 739.
94. See Ken Stier, Foreign Tax Cheats Find U.S. Banks a Safe Haven, TIME (Oct. 29,
2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1933288,00.html.
95. See Chinese investment in US: $2 trln and counting, supra note 17.
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foreign residents were to withdraw their deposits from their bank.96
These unintended consequences would damage the U.S. financial
sector and economy as a whole. As financial capital dries up, banks
would be forced to lend less money to American businesses. Many
industries would suffer and continue to suffer, such as the real
estate and the construction industries. In addition to the huge loss
in revenue among U.S. banks, many jobs in the financial sector
would be lost.
Despite these detrimental effects, the Treasury Department
attempted to loosen bank secrecy to correspond with other
countries' requests by proposing two regulations in 2001 and 2002.97
The first proposed regulation was to extend information reporting
requirements to bank deposit interest paid to "nonresident alien
individuals who are residents of other countries." 98 The second
proposed regulation narrowed the scope of the reporting
requirements to interest paid to residents of fourteen specific foreign
countries.99
Even with Treasury Department's good intentions to cooperate
with global tax information transparency, both regulations never
became effective. Banks and financial organizations around the
country have furiously lobbied against regulationsoo in order to
protect the secrecy of their foreign customer information and in fear
of potentially losing these valued customers. Banks eagerly met
with various tax policymakers to express concerns that the
regulation would cause foreign investors to withdraw their deposits
from U.S. banks.101
In light of the cost-benefit analysis, it may not be worthwhile
for the U.S. government to endure the firestorm of bank oppositions,
bank revenue loss, and financial sector job loss in exchange for the
collections of additional tax revenues in China. Given the current
96. Goulder, supra note 16, at 743.
97. Id.
98. Guidance on Reporting of Deposit Interest Paid to Nonresident Aliens, 66
Fed. Reg. 3925, 3926 Uan. 17, 2001) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1 & 31), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-regs/12610000.pdf.
99. Guidance on Reporting of Deposit Interest Paid to Nonresident Aliens, 67
Fed. Reg. 50386, 50386 (Aug. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1 & 31).
100. Goulder, supra note 16, at 743.
101. Id. at 744 ("Simply stated, international investors surely will move their
funds - potentially more than $100 billion - to banks in London, Zurich, Hong
Kong, and elsewhere if the regulation is finalized.").
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economic downturn and the staggering figures of potential bank
revenue loss, lifting bank secrecy laws would place the U.S. banks at
a huge competitive disadvantage globally.
B. China's Perspective
It should not be surprising that China has a similar objective in
attracting foreign capital domestically. Jos6 Manuel Barroso, the
president of the European Commission, believes that China is a
major international power blocking a global solution to the offshore
bank and secrecy problem.102 It is doing so to protect its own
secrecy jurisdiction, Hong Kong.103
As indicated in the earlier section, offshore banks that have
operated out of Switzerland and other traditional offshore financial
centers are now targeting Hong Kong.104  Amid a growing
crackdown on banking in Switzerland,105 wealthy people are
flocking to Hong Kong, where it offers some of the world's most
attractive bank secrecy accounts.106
China, and mainly Hong Kong, have benefited enormously by
enacting stringent bank secrecy laws that help wealthy foreigners
transfer their assets to its banks.107 Tax haven countries receive
extensive foreign investment, and, largely as a result, have enjoyed
very rapid economic growth over the past twenty-five years.108
China is a perfect example. The explosion of China's financial
industry has now made the country the second largest economy by
GDP and China has been very successful at maintaining the high
rate of growth for over two decades.
102. Lucy Komisar, China blocks international crackdown on offshore, says European
Commission President Barroso, THE KOMISAR SCOOP (Sept. 27, 2010),
http://thekomisarscoop.com/2010/09/china-blocks-international-crackdown-on-
offshore-says-european-commission-president-barroso (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Browning, supra note 9. ("In 2007, the Justice Department began a criminal
investigation into UBS and, later, other Swiss banks for selling private banking
services to wealthy Americans that allowed them to evade taxes. Last year, UBS
paid $780 million to settle the case. It later agreed to lift the veil of Swiss bank
secrecy and disclose the names of 4,450 American clients to the Internal Revenue
Service.")
106. Id.
107. Jek Aun Long et al., The Growth of Private Wealth Management Industry in
Singapore and Hong Kong, 6 CAP. MKT. L. J., 104, 117-18 (2011).
108. Dharmapala, supra note 32, at 1.
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With nonexistent tax capital gains and deposit interest, banks in
Hong Kong have benefited largely from the deposits its banks
received from wealthy American investors.109 Hong Kong is making
a concerted effort to replace Switzerland as the global center for
private banking.110 UBS, the largest bank in Switzerland, has lost
about $200 billion in assets from private banking clients over the last
two years in Switzerland."' But in Asia, it has won more new
money than it has lost.112 The bank plans to hire an additional 400
"client advisers," or private bankers, for its Asia-Pacific region,113
including Hong Kong. Hong Kong has become the Swiss bank's
"second home," and the bank plans to double its assets in Hong
Kong to twenty-five percent of its total within five years.114
Given the current golden opportunity with the failures of
offshore banks in Switzerland, it would be in Hong Kong's best
interest to continue attracting more investment around the world
and lend capital to global entities, including mainland Chinese
companies who need cash to grow their businesses.115 Chinese
entities flourish from Hong Kong's bank secrecy since they can
easily borrow a large sum of capital from banks in Hong Kong to
fund their businesses.
To exchange phenomenal capital growth in the financial sector
and economic development for wider information sharing with the
U.S. would seem illogical to the Chinese government. China's
primary goal should be to promote continued exponential growth
and development in Hong Kong and mainland China by
encouraging more foreign deposits and attracting more foreign
customers in the domestic banks.
109. See generally Browning, supra note 9.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Lipsher, supra note 42, at 645.
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VIII. Tax Information Exchange Agreement Viewed
Ineffective
It has also been widely viewed and criticized that TIEAs are
highly ineffective in the actual facilitation of information
exchange. 116 This is mainly due to Article 5 of the TIEA, which
requires that the requesting country must first identify the name of
the taxpayer before requesting any relevant tax information from
the other party.17  This is inherently very difficult to achieve.
Without granting tax authorities access to all financial records
necessary to determine if any of their citizens are concealing income,
such evidence is usually unavailable and nearly impossible to
obtain.118 Therefore, even if bank secrecy laws of a particular
country, e.g., China, were to be lifted, the U.S. government still may
not be able to obtain bank information if the IRS cannot first identify
which U.S. resident is hiding bank accounts in China.
Given the ineffectiveness and the insignificant role TIEAs
potentially play in information exchange, the U.S. and China would
be even less likely to enter into a TIEA. It would not be in the U.S.'s
or China's best interest to hastily sign into an ineffective tax
agreement that is seemingly effective to the public and potentially
provoke anxiety among their respective financial institutions foreign
residents with domestic bank accounts. It would be even less
desirable for both countries to risk massive losses of financial sector
revenue and jobs, which in turn would slow down the growth of
each country's economy for a fruitless tax information exchange
agreement.
IX. Conclusion
Tax information exchange is hindered because the U.S. and
China may rely on bank secrecy to improve the flow of foreign
capital into financial markets. While it would be ideal if there was a
universal, global effort to eliminate tax havens altogether, both the
U.S. and China still seem reluctant to crack down on tax evasion
because of the risk of endangering capital inflow. In the end, these
116. Addison, supra note 68, at 717-18; see also McIntyre, supra note 65, at 697
(discussing the ineffectiveness of the "fishing expedition" of the Switzerland treaty,
which is essentially the same as the Model TIEA).
117. Model TIEA, supra note 67, art. 5(5)(a).
118. Addison, supra note 68, at 717-18.
20121 427
428 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 35:2
two countries will always have their own best interests in mind
when negotiating an exchange agreement. In the current situation
state, entering into a TIEA appears to be both impractical and
disadvantageous.
Effective information sharing will likely require domestic
sacrifice and a mutual willingness to provide information, which
has not been seen thus far. Additional innovative and collective
actions must be invented and fostered to provide economic
incentives for both countries to relinquish their bank secrecy laws
and to enact and enforce effective TIEAs. Although the road to
transparent tax information exchange between the two countries
remains winding and uncertain, tax authorities will soon realize that
TIEA's are not the answers to offshore tax evasion but mutual
cooperation and reciprocity might be.
